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1.  Introduction 
 
I want to thank you for allowing me to speak to you today on an economic issue that is of great importance to 
citizens of the State of Connecticut and New England.  That issue is the retail and farm prices of milk and the lack of 
competition in the milk marketing channel.  I have economic expertise in the organization of food industries, their 
pricing practices and related public policies.  Over the past 25 years I have published several studies on the dairy 
industry and other food industries.
1 
The Connecticut, Massachusetts and New Hampshire legislatures have bills before them that seek to limit price 
gouging by processors and retailers.  This paper will expand upon our prior analysis of possible milk price laws 
(Cotterill and Rabinowitz 2002).  In that earlier piece we described the proposed Connecticut and Massachusetts fair 
pricing legislation as consumer oriented with few direct benefits to farmers, however, that description was in 
comparison to our second proposed plan.  Here we analyze the proposed fair pricing legislation in great detail and 
find that its implementation will benefit farmers as well as consumers.  In fact, our primary conclusion is that the 
proposed fair pricing legislation will most likely benefit farmers more than consumers.  Given that the primary cause 
of the wide retail- farm price spread is a steep drop in farm milk price, this is perhaps appropriate.. 
There are many reasons why farm milk prices are low at this time.  Dairy farming and raw milk markets are very 
complex and the policies that affect them are even more complex.  At the outset let us clearly identify the part of the 
dairy pricing problem that we address.  Our approach is a market channel approach that focuses on the pricing of milk 
at the farm gate, wholesale and retail levels. 
As we document below the New England dairy marketing channel is no longer competitively structured.   
Consequently farm and retail prices are not competitive prices.  This deviation from competition damages economic 
efficiency.  Resources are not allocated to production in a fashion that gives society the most for its fixed bundle of 
resources.  Deviation from competition also transfers income from farmers and consumers to the processors and 
retailers that have market power, i.e. the power to set prices in their favor.  For these economic reasons there is a need 
to implement the proposed fair pricing law, or some other policy, to redress the lack of competition.  The proposed 
law restructures incentives so that processors and retailers behave more like competitive firms. 
This testimony explains the current milk pricing situation, the proposed law’s impact, and the relationship 
between the proposed law and federal dairy policies, including a dairy Compact and the current fluid milk price 
subsidy, the milk income loss contract.  Finally, we discuss how to proceed with development of the proposed fair 
pricing law. 
 
II.  The Documented Premise:  Fluid Milk Processors and Supermarket Retailers in New England have 
Market Power and Use it to Capture More than their Fair (i.e. Competitive) Share of Channel Income 
and Wealth from Farmers and Consumers. 
 
Please see Cotterill et al. (2002), Cotterill (2002) and Cotterill and Rabinowitz (2002) for a detailed discussion of 
this point.  Also see Cotterill (2003) for a more extended discussion of public policy in a global economy that 
explicitly discusses the Dairy Compact movement and current New England milk pricing as an example of how 
agribusiness corporations play to win in the legislative and judicial arena.  Here we will only note that recent research 
and legal proceedings on milk prices in southern New England document that consumers currently pay approximately 
$3 per gallon while farmers receive approximately $1 per gallon.
2  The costs of processing and retailing milk 
including a competitive profit are approximately 1 dollar so there is an additional dollar in excess profits.  Our survey 
                                                 
1 That work includes two of the original and now classic research pieces in economics on the relationship between the 
concentration of sellers in a market and the market’s price level (Marion et al. 1977, Cotterill 1986, Weiss 1989).   
I have served as expert economist on several milk price antitrust cases and testified before the U.S. Congress on the Northeast 
Dairy Compact, milk prices, cheese prices, mergers, and rural development. My antitrust work includes analysis of over-order 
pricing, and several mergers related to milk pricing in New England, including the 1996 Stop and Shop Royal Ahold/Edwards 
merger and the 2001 Suiza/Stop and Shop long term strategic alliance for milk processing and distribution.  I have also conducted 
extensive research on the Northeast Dairy Compact. My Curriculum Vita is attached. 
2 This testimony will not focus on numbers.  It focuses on ideas.  For precise numbers see the cited papers. Dairy Policy for New England: Options at the State and Regional Level  Cotterill, R.W. 
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research documents this (Cotterill et. al. 2002).  The recent Midland Farms case moreover documents that milk sold 
“at cost” in a limited assortment store can be priced as low as $1.54 per gallon for skim and $1.84 per gallon for 
whole milk (Mohl 2003).  Retail prices in supermarkets are far above these costs.  Supermarket News, a leading 
weekly food industry newspaper, recently carried a story on noncompetitive milk pricing in New England and other 
parts of the country (Vosburgh 2003).  It is provided here as Attachment G. 
 
III.  The Policy Option:  Connecticut Attorney General Blumenthal’s Proposed Fair Pricing of Milk 
Law, the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth Proposed Price Gouging Law, and a Similar 
New Hampshire Bill 
 
Copies of the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire bills are provided as Attachment B, C and D.  A 
newspaper article, provided as Attachment F, describes the movement in Maine for a direct payment to farmers.  The 
proposed Connecticut and Massachusetts laws are quite similar.  The New Hampshire bill was quickly drafted and 
will most likely be amended to follow the lead of Connecticut and Massachusetts.  We support convergence among 
the three state bills so that the resulting laws would give uniform treatment to the New England milk industry outside 
of Maine.  Also the resulting law could then be jointly enforced.  Here we will discuss only the Massachusetts and 
Connecticut approaches. 
The Massachusetts bill triggers investigation of milk pricing when the retail price is 200% (twice) of the price 
paid farmers.  The Connecticut bill triggers investigation in a more detailed stage specific manner.  If the wholesale 
price charged to a retailer by a processor is 40% above the price paid farmers, investigation of the processor follows.  
If the retail prices is 40% above the wholesale price paid the processor, investigation of the retailer follows.  The 
combined impact of these two rules is 1.4 x 1.4 = 1.96, i.e. 196%.  Thus the Connecticut bill effectively incorporates 
the Massachusetts 200% retail mark-up ceiling but it will, if anything, trigger more investigations.  This is the case 
because a processor or retailer could conceivably violate the 40% rule without the total retail impact breaking the 196 
or 200% rule. 
Both the Connecticut and Massachusetts bills have one very important feature that distinguishes them from the 
New York law (Attachment E).  The New York retail price ceiling that triggers investigation is 200 percent of the 
federal milk market order’s minimum price whereas the Connecticut and Massachusetts bills operate off of “the price 
actually paid to the producer (CT)” and the farm price for Class I fluid milk (MA).” 
The New York price gouging law was passed as a safeguard for consumers when the legislative passed a law that 
gave the Commissioner of Agriculture emergency over-order pricing authority.  Any state mandated or cooperative 
bargaining over-order premium, or any other factor that raises retail prices to levels that are twice the federal order 
minimum price triggers investigation.  Thus the New York price gouging law limits the scope of cooperatives and 
state activity to implement over-order premiums.
3  It is exclusively oriented towards protecting consumers from price 
gouging. 
The proposed Connecticut and Massachusetts laws do not limit the ability of farmer-oriented groups to charge 
over-order premiums.  In fact the opposite is the case.  If the federal order class 1 minimum price drops to very low 
levels, such as the level it has been at since late 2001, then processors and retailers have an incentive under the 
proposed laws to pay farmers an over-order premium so that the price paid farmers goes up.  This allows the 
processor and retailer wider margins to cover costs, i.e. higher prices that do not trigger investigation. 
To understand how the proposed law works, consider an example under the Massachusetts bill’s 200% rule.  
With retail milk at $3 per gallon and farm price at $1 gallon, under the 200% Massachusetts approach the processor 
and retailers have options.  They can cut retail prices to $2.00 per gallon or they can increase farm prices via 
premiums to $1.50 per gallon.  Note that there is a built in bias towards working with farmers.  Channel firms 
keep $1.50 margin when they pay over-order premiums to farmers but they keep only $1 when they cut the 
retail price. Conduct under the proposed law will, if anything, be more beneficial to farmers than consumers.  
In an earlier paper (Cotterill 2002) we stressed that the current price gouging hurts farmers as much or more than 
consumers.  As the facts and figures cited in this testimony document the current gap between farm and retail price is 
due to farm prices being far below the cost of production.  If farm milk prices stay at current levels, around $12 
                                                 
3 See S 396-rr Section 2 of the New York Price Gouge Law provided here as Attachment E. Dairy Policy for New England: Options at the State and Regional Level  Cotterill, R.W. 
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dollars per hundred weight, virtually no New England dairy farms can survive.  Consequently, a law that gets farm 
prices up rather than closing the gap by cutting consumer prices is most appropriate for the long run health of the 
industry. New England’s dairy farms survive and New England’s dairy processors benefit from a nearby supply of 
milk.  
Now let us examine the proposed Connecticut law’s independent targeting of processors and retailers.   
Processors are open to investigation if the price that they charge retailers is higher than 140% of the price paid 
farmers.  Again as farm price drops processors have an incentive to mitigate that price drop by paying farmers an 
over-order premium.  For example, if a processor wants to earn 60 cents per gallon to process and deliver milk to 
retailers, then the price they need to pay farmers to comply with this proposed law is .60/.4 = $1.50 per gallon.  This is 
equivalent to $17.40 per hundredweight.  Processors would pay an over-order premium to bring a lower farm price up 
to this level.  Alternatively, processors could cut the wholesale price until it is 140% of the farm price, but this makes 
a deeper cut into their margin and thus is not as profitable.   
The same logic holds for retailers.  The 140% rule is applied to the wholesale price.  To come into compliance 
with the law they would prefer to elevate wholesale price rather than cut retail price.  If this creates a compliance 
problem for the processor, that firm would in turn pass the increased wholesale price back to the farmer via an 
increased over-order premium. 
Are the 140% rates in the proposed Connecticut law appropriate?  The answer is critical to the performance of 
the law and thus needs to be set either by the legislature or a designated commission.  The answer also depends on the 
target dollar margin that processors and retailers are able to capture from the marketplace.  We think that the target 
margin for processors is around 60 cents per gallon.  Thus, a 140% markup rule would give them an incentive to pay 
an over-order premium to raise the farm price to $1.50 per gallon ($17.40 per cwt.). 
At retail, the 140% markup rule is too high.  It gives retailers a 28.6% gross margin on milk.  The average 
margin for all products in a typical supermarket is around 25%, and milk is one of the highest turnover items in the 
store.  This means that milk can be as profitable in the store with a gross margin below 25%.  Historically, milk has 
had one of the lowest gross margins.  At the other extreme, a product like black pepper, a slow mover, has had one of 
the highest margins.  For this reason, we think a more appropriate markup rule at retail is 130%.  It gives a gross 
margin of 23%. 
With a 140% rule at processing, one obtains a $2.10 wholesale milk price.  Marking this up 130% gives a retail 
price at $2.73 per gallon.  In summary, farmers receive over-order premiums that raise the raw fluid milk price to 
$1.50 per gallon ($17.40 per cwt.) and consumers see a price cut from $3.00 per gallon to $2.73.  Both farmers and 
consumers benefit given the current pricing situation in Southern New England. 
We would stress that this redistribution to farmers occurs only when the raw fluid milk price drops below $1.50 
per gallon ($17.40 per cwt.).  At higher raw fluid prices, the law would not be needed to return the 60 cent target 
margin to processors. 
The proposed law induces this farm premium generating behavior only when the retailer and processor are 
pricing above their costs.  If the wholesale and retail prices are not sufficient to cover their respective costs the 
Connecticut law gives them an out in Section 2b.  This means that the proposed law will never cause a processor or 
retailer to lose money.
4  
Processors and retailers clearly have an incentive to raise farm price when they change prices to comply with the 
law.  What if they go too far and, with farmers in tow, raise retail prices to even higher levels at the expense of 
consumers?  If this law is passed with its increased scrutiny of milk pricing we question whether processors and 
retailers would embark on such a price path.  If they do they invite even tougher regulation. 
Another possible outcome suggests that both farmers and consumers will benefit.  The key prices are the farm 
and retail price.  Processors can be sure that they comply with the law if they pay farmers premiums and retailers can 
be sure that they comply with the law by cutting retail prices.  Under these actions, neither has to rely on the other to 
transmit a price change to farmers (the retailer’s wholesale price increase scenario) or to consumers (the processor’s 
wholesale price cut scenario). 
                                                 
4 They may nonetheless lose money for other reasons.  The proposed law guarantees no one a profit, nor does it prevent them 
from making a profit. Dairy Policy for New England: Options at the State and Regional Level  Cotterill, R.W. 
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The bottom line here is that the Commissioner of Agriculture or a designated commission must monitor actual 
performance of the channel firms, over-order premiums, and consumer price changes when raw milk prices drop to 
levels low enough to make these laws binding.   
Note that the Connecticut approach allows the Commissioner to investigate processors directly.  The 
Massachusetts approach focuses upon the retailer and may not influence processor pricing.  If this is indeed the case 
then the processor has no incentive to pay premiums to farmers and no incentives to limit wholesale prices.  The 
Connecticut approach seems preferable.  
Second note that these proposed laws do not dictate price to processors and retailers.  Firms are not regulated like 
a public utility.  The linking of retail and farm price by a percent markup rule only changes the constraints within 
which firms set prices to earn profits. 
 
IV. An Explanation of the Proposed Fair Pairing Law fits with Federal Dairy Policy and the Compact 
Movement 
 
The proposed fair pricing law is different than the federal dairy policies and the proposed renewal of the 
Compact.  The Committee should not conclude that federal policies will solve the New England dairy problem; 
therefore there is no need for the fair pricing approach.  That simply is not true for many reasons.  Certainly, federal 
dairy policy is not solving New England’s problems today. 
This New England fair pricing approach can address New England’s dairy problems without federal assistance.
5  
It can do so because it eliminates the free rider problem in farmer bargaining.  Cooperative bargaining with processors 
(and retailers) has always been difficult. Paying over-order premiums reduces their profits therefore they switch to a 
farmer that is not in the bargaining cooperative.  This defeats the over-order premium effort.  The same free rider 
problem exists when an over-order premium is imposed by one state but not others in the milk shed -- a move that 
Vermont is currently contemplating.  Processors look elsewhere for milk. 
The structure of the fair pricing approach generates premiums for farmers because processors and retailers under 
the law’s constraint want to pay them. Under the law’s constraint it is the most profitable way to comply with the law. 
The proposed law “kills two birds with one stone”. It constrains channel market power when farm prices are low and 
it eliminates the free rider problem that has always made it difficult to collect over-order premiums.  
Note that one state can enact the proposed law without others following suit. This is not true for farmer 
cooperative or state bargaining for over order-premiums. Because of the free rider problem one must have the entire 
milkshed in the bargaining unit. . However, for the proposed policy to have its most complete impact on farmers all 
New England states, possibly except Maine, should adopt it. This is because the large plants that the processors 
operate supply milk to several states in the region.  
For example, if only Connecticut adopted the proposed law and the Dean Foods/Garelick plant in Franklin, MA 
complies by paying farmers premiums for milk sold in CT; it is only a small fraction of the milk processed in the 
plant. That added money would be paid out to all farmers who supplied milk to the plant so it would be diluted. If all 
states where the plant’s milk is sold have similar fair pricing laws, then there would be no dilution of the over-order 
premium.  
Permit us to now summarize how the federal dairy policies work, how a compact works, and how the fair pricing 
approach relates to that constellation of complexity.  Raw milk markets for fluid consumption are local or regional but 
the raw milk market for cheese and butter is national.  There are two types of federal milk policies.  First one has the 
support price policy for milk used to manufacture cheese and butter.  When supply of milk is long, as it is now, the 
USDA buys these commodities or nonfat dry milk to keep the price paid farmers for raw milk at around $9.90 per 
hundred lbs. of milk.  When the nationwide supply of milk is short the manufacturing price moves above $9.90. 
The second federal policy is the federal milk market order system.  It sets minimum prices for raw milk used for 
fluid bottling purposes in several regions such as the Northeast.  The fluid minimum prices are set by adding a fixed 
                                                 
5 We also think that this approach will not raise interstate commerce clause problems and that it does not require federal approval 
like a Compact; however, we defer to legal expertise.  The New York law has raised no such objections. Dairy Policy for New England: Options at the State and Regional Level  Cotterill, R.W. 
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dollar amount set by Congress for each area to the national price for manufacturing milk.
6  So if milk is short and the 
manufacturing milk price moves up from $9.90 the fluid minimum prices in each federal order also move up.  If milk 
is long and manufacturing milk price is bumping along near the support price, federal minimum fluid prices are also 
low in regional fluid markets.   
In an attempt to have a more “market driven” milk economy, the entire federal order system has been ratcheted 
down.
7  The support price for manufacturing milk in 1978 was $9.87 per hundredweight (Groves, 2003).  In 25 years, 
the support price in nominal dollars has risen only 3 cents!  In real terms it obviously has plummeted.  Clearly, 
farmers have been forced to get much more efficient in their production practices and these efficiencies have been 
ruthlessly passed forward to others in the market channel.
8 
The federal class I prices have also narrowed relative to the manufacturing milk price, and one now stresses that 
they are minimum fluid prices.  If one has a strong bargaining cooperative in a fluid market, i.e. one that represents 
nearly all of the farmers in the milkshed, they can and often do bargain for over-order premiums that raise the fluid 
price for raw milk.  For an interesting example of over-order pricing see Cotterill (2001).  It explains how over-order 
pricing in Chicago resulted in prices equal to those paid farmers in Boston.  The 1997-2001 Dairy Compact’s price 
elevation simply restored the price difference that Congress mandated between Boston and Chicago.  We will have 
more to say on this below.  Today, Midwestern farmers are receiving higher prices than Northeast farmers because 
they are collecting over-order premiums that are so high that they more than offset the fluid differential between the 
two regions. This is truly perverse. Milk produced in the East, near dense urban populations, should be more valuable 
than milk produced in the rural upper Midwest. 
We state the most important fact again.  In this federal milk pricing system the federal order minimum fluid milk 
prices that farmers in New England receive are not driven or influenced by the cost of producing milk in New 
England.  The federal minimums are driven by supply and demand in the national manufacturing milk market.   
Now lets look at how the national manufacturing milk market behaves.  The milk factories in the west with over 
a thousand cows per operation, and as many as 14,000 cows per operation, operate with subsidized water for the 
production of irrigated alfalfa. They can produce milk for several dollars per hundredweight less than a New England 
farm.
9  As we speak, Western dairies are expanding milk production while New England farmers are going out of 
business. The national manufacturing price and the corresponding federal order minimum fluid price tend to be lower 
than what a New England farm can tolerate, even with the modest predicted price recovery next fall to a $13 
manufacturing milk price (Cropp 2003).  This condition will tend to persist in the future. 
The solution in the past was to raise prices received in New England by setting a much higher federal minimum 
price for fluid (bottled) milk in New England. Yet, in October 2002, the most recent month with data, the national 
manufacturing milk price was $10.15 per cwt. and the federal minimum fluid price at Boston was $13.40 (USDA 
                                                 
6 The truly curious and intrepid can go to federal market order one website to see first hand how this is done for the Northeast.  It 
is www.fmmone.com. 
7 Some such as Ronald Knutson, professor emeritus at Texas A&M, and eminence gris of milk marketing economists, argue that 
it needs to be ratcheted even lower to “solve” our diary problems (Cheese Reporter, 2003). 
8 Elsewhere I have described the situation as follows:  Rural America is decimated in the name of efficiency (Egan 2002). Factory 
farms and huge plants owned by multinationals in very concentrated processing markets, operations that often generate 
substantial environmental and social externalities, are replacing family farms and open competitive marketing channels. … 
Purveyors of the Washington consensus, a 19
th century free market approach, claim to seek consumer benefit. Yet they would get 
it by lowering farm market prices rather than by eliminating the increase in market channel profits that comes with concentration 
and market power.  This choice validates the right of channel firms to ever increasing profits at the expense of the farmer.  The 
farmers' only counsel is to get more efficient.  The cynical core of this reasoning is the often-forwarded claim that the increased 
profits of market channel firms are evidence of their efficiency. Why are those profits not destroyed by competition that passes 
them on to consumers?  Would that farmers could show their efficiency by capturing profits from the system.  Power and the lack 
of power are the reality today.  (Cotterill 2003 p.23). 
9 See the cost of production studies in Attachment I.  Large western farms with over 1000 cows can make profits at current prices 
($11-12).  We also provide a cost of production study for Maine, by Professor Timothy Dalton, University of Maine.  Midsized 
Maine farms (95 cows) need at least $15.59 per hundredweight to cover  their short run operating and overhead expenses, and 
need $21.56 to cover all costs. Large farms (200 cows) need $13.12 and $17.58 respectively..  Costs in other New England states 
are similar. Dairy Policy for New England: Options at the State and Regional Level  Cotterill, R.W. 
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2002a). The blend price, i.e. the average proceeds from selling some manufacturing milk and some fluid milk in New 
England are higher than the manufacturing milk price, but nowhere near high enough to keep dairy farming profitable 
in New England (See Attachment I). For comparison the federal minimum fluid price set by Congress in October 
2002, for the upper Midwest (Chicago and Minneapolis), was much lower, $11.95 so their blend price is also lower 
(USDA 2002b). This especially true because much more of their milk goes for cheese and butter at the $10.15 per 
cwt. price. 
Blend prices are no longer the final arbiter of farm level prices.  In recent times, the new “market driven” federal 
order milk pricing system has let other forces i.e. over-order premiums determine; the relative fortunes of farmers in 
different regions of the country. The mailbox farm price is defined as the actual price that farmers receive for their 
milk. It adds over-order premiums, quality premiums, and deductions for hauling and other services to the blend 
price. The mailbox price can be above the federal order blend price if premiums are substantial.   
Adding woe to misery mailbox prices are not providing Northeast farmers relief.  For example in October 2002, 
the most recent month for which we have data, the mailbox farm price in the Northeast was lower than it was in many 
other parts of the nation, including the upper Midwest!  In the Northeast it was $11.74 per hundredweight, while in 
Minnesota it was $12.18 per hundredweight, and in Wisconsin it was $12.38 per hundredweight.  A map of all 
mailbox prices for the total U.S. is provided as Attachment H.
10 New England dairy farmers are disadvantaged 
because over-order premiums are higher in the Midwest and elsewhere.  What gives?  As we explained in Cotterill 
(2002), processor and retailer market power limits the abilities of Northeast farmers and their cooperatives to secure 
over-order premiums.  Ergo the need for the proposed fair pricing law, a new compact, or continued and much higher 
subsidies for New England.  Agrimark economist, Robert Wellington, has called the current federal subsidy program 
a “safety net on a concrete floor” (See Attachment F).  
 Note that federal order fluid pricing and Compact pricing use public power, i.e. law, to set fluid milk price 
minimums.  The state laws proposed here are no more intrusive than the federal market order laws.  In fact channel 
firms have a choice.  They can comply by documenting that their costs justify high prices (extremely unlikely in the 
current situation).  Alternatively, they can comply by paying premiums to farmers or by cutting their output prices.  
The fair pricing approach is not public utility regulation such as the legislature does for electricity.   
Finally, consider the milk income loss contract subsidy program.  When it was clear that the Compact was not to 
be renewed, New England congressmen allied with upper Midwest congressmen to create this program.  In effect, it 
provides a level of income support equivalent to the old New England dairy Compact to dairy farmers nationwide, but 
only on annual production up to 2.4 million pounds of milk.  Larger farm production units are only covered for this 
amount of milk.  The program was budgeted for approximately $2 billion in subsidies, however expenditures to date 
are far beyond that.  The lack of any supply control (and this income transfer which retards exit) contributes to low 
farm milk prices.  Given current budget deficit concerns, this program may be vulnerable.  Will supply control be 
reinstated to raise milk prices?  Will a Compact replace it without supply control?  Concerning the proposed fair 
pricing, as long as the farm-retail price spread violates the law, one would have payment of over-order premiums.  
This would occur even if farmers received subsidies, because the law as written drives off the market price processors 
pay farmers. 
 
V. How to Proceed 
 
Clearly work needs to be done to refine the fair pricing concept.  It is an entirely new approach to milk policy, 
perhaps the first truly new milk policy idea in 75 years.  The next steps for developing this legislation should include 
the following.  First, the Attorneys General of Connecticut, Massachusetts and other New England states have 
assembled confidential information from processors and retailers to investigate for antitrust violations including price 
fixing.  It includes retail prices, wholesale prices, costs of processing and retailing, and gross and net margins.  The 
Vermont Department of Agriculture is compiling similar information for Vermont.  This information might be used to 
calibrate the law and gain additional insights into how it would work. 
                                                 
10 Go to our website http://www.are.uconn.edu/FMKTC.html and click on “Milk Price Gouging”, “Other Related Items”, and 
“Hoard’s Dairyman Current Mailbox Milk Prices” to see a color coded map of the U.S. that gives the most current farm level 
milk prices for different regions.  It is updated periodically. Dairy Policy for New England: Options at the State and Regional Level  Cotterill, R.W. 
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There is a second more inclusive task.  The administration of the law:  There are many details to be worked out.  
Does the legislature want to set rates, or would it establish a commission, possibly in conjunction with other New 
England states to collect information from the industry on a regular basis and set rates to achieve target performance 
levels?  For example, this program might be targeted towards establishing a minimum fluid pay price for farmers.  
Does this legislature want to set a target fluid pay price for farmers?  The commission could also monitor impacts on 
consumers so that excessive margin widening conduct, such as that that occurred during the 1997-2001 Compact era 
(Cotterill and Dhar 2003,Cotterill 2001), and the post-Compact 2001-2003 era (Cotterill, 2002) does not occur. 
The proposed law also needs to involve interregional cooperation to ensure uniform treatment of firms that span 
state borders.  In fact development of the law needs interregional cooperation. 
We close with a recent statement by Steve Kerr, the Vermont Commissioner of Agriculture who recently said, 
“We’re hungry for ideas.”  The single best answer to this problem (of failing farms) is a better price for milk, but the 
state isn’t in a position to do that."  Ladies and gentleman, Connecticut and other New England states are in a position 
to raise farm milk prices from their current low levels.  The proposed fair pricing law is one way to do it.  One thing is 
clear, if New England citizens want to retain the few dairy farms that are left, the pricing of milk has to change.  And 
we are not talking about price recovery next fall.  Milk pricing practices and institutions have to change. 
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Attachment D: New Hampshire Proposed Law An Act Prohibiting Unfair Trade Practices in the Production and Sale 
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Attachment F: Grocers gouge on milk sales, experts allege Shelf prices remain constant even though farmers get less. 
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Attachment G: Spill It; An Outpouring of Support for Milk-Price Ceilings from Consumers and Lawmakers has 
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